Public Legitimacy and the Enforcement of the Rule of Law in the European Union: Between Legal Authority and Democratic Backsliding

Abstract

The rule of law has become one of the most contested foundations of the European Union in the context of democratic backsliding, selective compliance, and increasing public polarization across member states. Although the European Union has developed a sophisticated legal architecture for monitoring and enforcing compliance, legal authority alone does not guarantee effective enforcement. This article argues that the long-term effectiveness of rule-of-law enforcement depends not only on institutional design and legal mechanisms, but also on public legitimacy. Building on scholarship on legitimacy, compliance, and supranational governance, the article examines how citizens evaluate rule-of-law interventions, how political actors shape those evaluations, and why support for enforcement varies across different national and political contexts. It proposes that public legitimacy operates as a mediating layer between formal legal authority and real enforcement outcomes. When citizens perceive enforcement as procedurally fair, normatively justified, and politically impartial, supranational institutions are more likely to sustain compliance pressure. By contrast, when enforcement is framed as partisan intrusion or external domination, legal action may trigger backlash and weaken institutional authority. The article contributes to law and governance scholarship by integrating legal compliance research with socio-political theories of legitimacy, and by showing that the future of EU rule-of-law enforcement depends on the interaction between judicial authority, political contestation, and public acceptance.